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Rightly	  or	  wrongly,	  discussion	  of	  intuitions,	  and	  especially	  of	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy,	  has	  dominated	  much	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  metaphilosophical	  theorizing.	  It	  is	  widely	  (but	  not	  wholly)	  agreed	  that	  the	  ‘standard	  philosophical	  methodology’	  (whatever	  that	  is)	  is	  one	  that	  affords	  a	  central	  role	  to	  ‘intuitions’	  (whatever	  those	  are).	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  literature	  that	  sets	  out	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  methods	  of	  traditional	  analytic	  philosophy	  are	  good	  ones	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  widely-­‐perceived	  reliance	  on	  intuition	  is	  legitimate:	  critics	  of	  traditional	  philosophical	  methods	  often	  attack	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions;	  defenders	  of	  traditional	  methods	  often	  defend	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions.	  Perhaps	  you	  suspect	  by	  inference	  from	  my	  tone	  that	  I	  am	  not	  wholly	  convinced	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  intuitions	  do	  play	  central	  roles	  in	  traditional	  philosophical	  methods.	  You	  are	  correct:	  I	  have	  my	  doubts.	  I	  expect	  that	  the	  contemporary	  focus	  on	  intuitions	  has	  exaggerated	  their	  importance	  in	  traditional	  philosophical	  methods,	  as	  actually	  practiced	  by	  traditional	  philosophers.	  I	  am	  by	  no	  means	  alone	  in	  my	  skepticism;	  although	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  intuitions	  for	  standard	  methods	  is	  justly	  deserving	  of	  the	  title	  of	  orthodoxy,	  it	  has	  recently	  become	  increasingly	  fashionable	  to	  call	  this	  orthodoxy	  into	  question.	  This	  chapter	  will	  consider	  three	  themes	  relating	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  intuitions	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy.	  In	  §1,	  I’ll	  review	  and	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  philosophical	  use	  of	  words	  like	  ‘intuitively’	  and	  any	  kinds	  of	  mental	  states	  that	  might	  be	  called	  ‘intuitions’.	  In	  §2,	  I’ll	  consider	  the	  widely-­‐discussed	  analogy	  between	  intuitive	  experience	  and	  perceptual	  experience,	  drawing	  out	  some	  interesting	  similarities	  and	  differences.	  Finally,	  in	  §3,	  I’ll	  introduce	  the	  recent	  movement	  of	  ‘experimental	  philosophy’,	  and	  consider	  to	  what	  extent	  its	  projects	  are	  tied	  up	  with	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy.	  My	  primary	  aim	  will	  be	  to	  survey	  and	  explain;	  I	  will	  make	  no	  effort,	  however,	  to	  hide	  the	  fact	  that	  I’m	  a	  philosopher	  and	  a	  partisan	  to	  some	  of	  these	  debates.	  So	  there	  will	  be	  some	  arguments	  for	  controversial	  points	  of	  view,	  too—hopefully	  these	  will	  be	  easily	  perceptible,	  and	  my	  opponents	  fairly	  represented.	  Limitations	  of	  space	  demand	  a	  rather	  superficial	  treatment	  of	  most	  of	  our	  topics;	  endnotes	  will	  direct	  the	  reader	  to	  more	  comprehensive	  discussions.	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1.	  Philosophers’	  use	  of	  ‘intuitively’	  It	  is	  widely	  believed	  among	  philosophers	  writing	  about	  the	  methodology	  of	  contemporary	  philosophy	  that	  the	  latter	  depends	  in	  important	  ways	  on	  intuitions.	  Alvin	  Goldman	  (2007)	  espouses	  orthodoxy	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  “[o]ne	  thing	  that	  distinguishes	  philosophical	  methodology	  from	  the	  methodology	  of	  the	  sciences	  is	  its	  extensive	  and	  avowed	  reliance	  on	  intuition.”	  (p.	  1)	  Why	  do	  so	  many	  philosophers	  consider	  it	  obvious	  that	  philosophical	  methodology	  proceeds	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  intuitions?	  One	  obvious	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  philosophers	  often	  describe	  themselves	  as	  relying	  on	  intuitions;	  here	  is	  one	  of	  myriad	  examples	  of	  such	  quotations:	  Externalists	   about	  belief	  hold	   that	  whether	  a	   subject	  believes	   that	  P,	  or	  whether	   the	   subject	  believes,	  instead,	  that	  Q,	  depends,	  at	  least	  sometimes,	  on	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  external	  to	  the	  subject	  herself.	  The	  dispositional	  account	  offered	  here	  is	  compatible	  with	  our	  intuitions	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  cases	  typically	  invoked	  to	  support	  externalism.	  In	  fact,	  the	  present	  account	  comports	  more	   exactly	   with	   our	   intuitions	   in	   such	   cases	   than	   do	   standard	   externalist	   views.	  (Schwitzgebel	  2002,	  p.	  266)	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  find	  many	  more	  instances	  of	  such	  quotations,	  in	  which	  intuition	  is	  invoked	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  philosophical	  argument.	  It	  should	  be	  recognized,	  however,	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  explicit	  invocation	  of	  intuition,	  although	  not	  at	  all	  uncommon,	  is	  less	  ubiquitous	  than	  some	  causal	  metaphilosophers	  may	  suppose.	  In	  many	  canonical	  instances	  of	  what	  is	  widely	  taken	  to	  be	  reliance	  on	  intuition,	  the	  term	  ‘intuition’	  does	  not	  actually	  appear.	  (See	  Deutsch	  (2010),	  especially	  p.	  450.)	  Consider	  the	  following	  three	  cases	  that	  are	  widely	  taken	  to	  be	  paradigmatic	  instances	  of	  philosophical	  reliance	  on	  intuition.	  First,	  some	  of	  Saul	  Kripke’s	  arguments	  against	  the	  descriptive	  theory	  of	  proper	  names	  invoke	  judgments	  about	  thought	  experiments—in	  a	  famous	  case,	  Kripke	  (1980)	  argues	  that	  if	  the	  descriptive	  theory	  were	  true,	  then	  the	  name	  ‘Gödel’	  would	  refer	  to	  a	  particular	  individual	  Schmidt,	  but	  that	  this	  is	  the	  wrong	  result	  (pp.	  83-­‐84).	  Second,	  in	  another	  widely-­‐discussed	  case,	  Judith	  Jarvis	  Thompson	  (1971)	  argues	  that	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  for	  a	  subject	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  that	  will	  have	  the	  result	  of	  ending	  the	  life	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  dependent	  on	  one;	  this,	  she	  argues,	  is	  relevantly	  similar	  to	  abortion.	  Third,	  in	  perhaps	  the	  most-­‐discussed	  thought	  experiment	  within	  metaphilosophy,1	  Edmund	  Gettier	  (1963)	  argued	  against	  what	  was	  then	  the	  received	  view,	  that	  justified	  true	  belief	  was	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  knowledge,	  by	  providing	  a	  counterexample:	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  a	  subject	  has	  a	  belief	  that	  is	  both	  justified	  and	  true,	  but	  is	  not	  knowledge.	  Notably,	  none	  of	  these	  authors,	  in	  their	  own	  canonical	  presentations	  of	  these	  thought	  experiments,	  invoked	  the	  word	  ‘intuition’	  or	  ‘intuitively’.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Weatherson	  (manuscript)	  for	  the	  suggestion	  that	  this	  focus	  on	  Gettier’s	  case	  may	  be	  regrettable.	  2	  Kripke	  (1980)	  writes	  that	  “since	  the	  man	  who	  discovered	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  arithmetic	  is	  in	  fact	  Schmidt,	  we,	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  ‘Gödel’,	  are	  in	  fact	  [on	  the	  descriptivist	  view	  in	  question]	  always	  referring	  to	  Schmidt.	  But	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	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What	  this	  fact	  shows	  is	  debatable.	  Deutsch	  (2010)	  and	  Cappelen	  (2012)	  take	  this	  and	  related	  considerations	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  much	  less	  reason	  than	  is	  typically	  supposed	  to	  think	  that	  philosophers	  are	  relying	  on	  intuitions.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  although	  philosophers	  do	  very	  often	  rely	  on	  intuitions,	  they	  don’t	  always	  signal	  such	  reliance	  with	  the	  word	  “intuition”.	  By	  way	  of	  analogy,	  it	  is	  overwhelmingly	  plausible	  that	  chemists	  often	  rely	  on	  sensory	  experience	  in	  an	  evidential	  capacity—for	  example,	  when	  one	  performs	  a	  given	  sample	  analysis,	  one	  relies	  in	  part	  on	  the	  visual	  experiences	  one	  undergoes	  while	  examining	  a	  component’s	  color.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  at	  all	  surprising	  if	  articles	  in	  the	  leading	  science	  journals	  rarely	  mentioned	  the	  perceptual	  experiences	  of	  the	  scientists.	  We	  expect	  the	  journal	  to	  report,	  in	  objective	  terms,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  experiment;	  it	  is	  understood	  implicitly	  that	  the	  researcher’s	  epistemic	  access	  to	  those	  results	  is	  mediated	  by	  perceptual	  experience.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  one	  might	  hold	  that	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  thought	  experiment	  verdicts	  in	  the	  cases	  just	  mentioned	  themselves	  are	  simply	  put	  forward,	  even	  though	  a	  philosopher’s	  justification	  for	  these	  claims	  depends	  on	  their	  having	  had	  certain	  intuitions.	  There	  is	  no	  incoherence	  in	  this	  view;	  I	  expect	  that	  many	  philosophers	  who	  think	  intuitions	  are	  important	  will	  respond	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  explicit	  invocation	  of	  ‘intuition’	  in	  this	  way.	  Someone	  taking	  this	  tack	  might	  enjoy	  some	  (intuitive!)	  support	  from	  the	  observation	  that	  even	  when	  philosophers	  do	  not	  use	  the	  word	  ‘intuition’	  or	  its	  cognates,	  it	  may	  seem	  very	  natural	  to	  regard	  them	  as	  relying	  implicitly	  on	  intuitions;	  often,	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  appropriate	  paraphrase	  will	  include	  such	  language.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  Gettier’s	  (1963)	  famous	  argument	  about	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  given	  subject	  knows	  a	  given	  proposition.	  As	  indicated	  above,	  Gettier	  does	  not	  mention	  intuition	  directly;	  he	  simply	  sets	  out	  a	  case,	  and	  states	  the	  relevant	  verdicts	  about	  it:	  Suppose	   that	   Smith	   and	   Jones	   have	   applied	   for	   a	   certain	   job.	   And	   suppose	   that	   Smith	   has	  strong	  evidence	  for	  the	  following	  conjunctive	  proposition:	  (d)	  Jones	  is	  the	  man	  who	  will	  get	  the	  job,	  and	  Jones	  has	  ten	  coins	  in	  his	  pocket.	  Smith's	  evidence	   for	   (d)	  might	  be	   that	   the	  president	  of	   the	  company	  assured	  him	   that	   Jones	  would	  in	  the	  end	  be	  selected,	  and	  that	  he,	  Smith,	  had	  counted	  the	  coins	  in	  Jones's	  pocket	  ten	  minutes	  ago.	  Proposition	  (d)	  entails:	  (e)	  The	  man	  who	  will	  get	  the	  job	  has	  ten	  coins	  in	  his	  pocket.	  Let	  us	  suppose	  that	  Smith	  sees	  the	  entailment	  from	  (d)	  to	  (e),	  and	  accepts	  (e)	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  (d),	  for	  which	  he	  has	  strong	  evidence.	  In	  this	  case,	  Smith	  is	  clearly	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  (e)	  is	  true.	  But	  imagine,	  further,	  that	  unknown	  to	  Smith,	  he	  himself,	  not	  Jones,	  will	  get	  the	  job.	  And,	   also,	   unknown	   to	   Smith,	   he	  himself	   has	   ten	   coins	   in	  his	  pocket.	   Proposition	   (e)	   is	   then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  we	  are	  not.	  We	  simply	  are	  not.”	  (p.	  84)	  Thompson	  (1971)	  writes	  of	  her	  case	  that	  “I	  imagine	  you	  would	  regard	  this	  as	  outrageous,	  which	  suggests	  that	  something	  really	  is	  wrong	  with	  that	  plausible-­‐sounding	  argument	  I	  mentioned	  a	  moment	  ago.”	  (p.	  71)	  Gettier’s	  (1963)	  presentation	  is	  given	  in	  the	  main	  text.	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true,	  though	  proposition	  (d),	  from	  which	  Smith	  inferred	  (e),	  is	  false.	  In	  our	  example,	  then,	  all	  
of	  the	  following	  are	  true:	  (i)	  (e)	  is	  true,	  (ii)	  Smith	  believes	  that	  (e)	  is	  true,	  and	  (iii)	  Smith	  is	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  (e)	  is	  true.	  But	  it	  is	  equally	  clear	  that	  Smith	  does	  not	  know	  that	  (e)	  is	  true;	   for	   (e)	   is	   true	   in	  virtue	  of	   the	  number	  of	   coins	   in	  Smith's	  pocket,	  while	  Smith	  does	  not	  know	  how	  many	  coins	  are	  in	  Smith’s	  pocket,	  and	  bases	  his	  belief	  in	  (e)	  on	  a	  count	  of	  the	  coins	  in	   Jones's	   pocket,	   whom	   he	   falsely	   believes	   to	   be	   the	   man	   who	   will	   get	   the	   job.	   (p.	   122,	  emphasis	  added)	  Suppose	  Gettier	  had	  instead	  written	  in	  the	  emphasized	  portion	  above,	  “in	  our	  example,	  then,	  all	  of	  the	  following	  are	  intuitively	  true…”	  and	  continued	  as	  before.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  that	  this	  would	  have	  represented	  a	  significant	  difference.	  What	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  “intuition”	  and	  its	  cognates	  in	  a	  given	  philosophical	  text	  is	  probably	  not	  a	  particularly	  important	  guide	  to	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  conclusions	  advanced	  in	  that	  text.	  It	  is	  certainly	  very	  plausible	  that	  in	  at	  least	  many	  of	  these	  cases,	  one	  does	  no	  violence	  to	  a	  philosopher’s	  intentions	  by	  embedding	  key	  stated	  premises	  inside	  an	  “intuitively”.	  (I’d	  wager	  that	  most	  philosophers	  would	  do	  no	  better	  than	  chance	  at	  guessing	  by	  memory	  whether	  the	  original	  presentations	  of	  canonical	  philosophical	  arguments	  did	  include	  “intuitive”	  language—even	  when	  considering	  their	  own	  past	  work.)	  But	  what	  does	  this	  show	  about	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  themselves	  in	  the	  arguments	  in	  question?	  It	  would	  show	  quite	  a	  lot,	  given	  a	  principle	  like	  this	  one:	  
(Straightforward)	  	   If	  “intuitively,	  p”	  is	  an	  appropriate	  gloss	  of	  a	  philosopher’s	  claim,	  then	  that	  philosopher	  relies	  on	  an	  intuition	  as	  evidence	  for	  p.	  If	  Straightfoward	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  attribute	  evidential	  reliance	  on	  intuitions	  to	  many	  philosophical	  arguments.	  For	  example,	  since	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  characterize	  Gettier’s	  argument	  partly	  with	  “intuitively,	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  have	  knowledge,”	  Straightforward	  has	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  central	  claim	  in	  Gettier’s	  argument—that	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  case	  under	  consideration	  lacks	  knowledge—rests	  evidentially	  on	  a	  intuition	  (a	  natural	  candidate	  here	  would	  be	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  subject	  lacks	  knowledge).	  But	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  doubt	  whether	  Straightforward	  properly	  captures	  the	  relationship	  between	  “intuitively”	  and	  epistemology;	  for	  one	  thing,	  it	  appears	  as	  if	  almost	  anything	  that	  one	  knows	  can	  be	  naturally	  embedded	  inside	  an	  “intuitively”	  in	  some	  contexts—if,	  for	  instance,	  someone	  gave	  a	  philosophical	  argument	  for	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  personal	  property,	  and	  that	  consequently,	  nobody	  owns	  anything,	  it	  would	  be	  perfectly	  natural	  for	  me	  to	  point	  out	  that	  “intuitively,	  I	  own	  a	  tweed	  jacket”.3	  Straightforward	  would	  have	  the	  implication,	  then,	  that	  intuition	  is	  or	  supplies	  an	  important	  part	  of	  my	  evidence	  for	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Williamson	  (2007,	  pp.	  218-­‐19)	  makes	  roughly	  the	  same	  observation.	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proposition	  about	  what	  clothing	  I	  own.	  But	  this	  implication	  is	  somewhat	  counterintuitive.4	  Nevertheless,	  it	  has	  its	  defenders.5	  If	  Straightforward	  isn’t	  the	  right	  story	  about	  what	  “intuitively”	  is	  doing	  in	  philosophical	  language,	  or	  in	  appropriate	  paraphrases	  of	  philosophical	  language,	  then	  what	  is	  such	  language	  all	  about?	  One	  attractive	  idea	  is	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  being	  used	  as	  a	  hedge.	  (See	  Cappelen	  (2012),	  pp.	  36-­‐39.)	  In	  cases	  where	  a	  speaker	  doesn’t	  wish	  to	  commit	  fully	  to	  the	  proposed	  content,	  she	  may	  offer	  it	  in	  a	  hedged	  way;	  instead	  of	  saying	  “the	  Red	  Sox	  play	  the	  Rangers	  tonight,”	  one	  might	  hedge,	  saying	  “I	  think	  the	  Red	  Sox	  play	  the	  Rangers	  tonight”	  or	  “I	  heard	  that	  the	  Red	  Sox	  play	  the	  Rangers	  tonight”.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  one	  might	  use	  “intuitively”	  to	  weaken	  one’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  philosophical	  thesis;	  instead	  of	  boldly	  asserting	  “this	  is	  a	  case	  of	  justified	  belief”,	  one	  hedges,	  saying	  “intuitively,	  this	  is	  a	  case	  of	  justified	  belief”.	  On	  the	  hedging	  hypothesis,	  it	  is	  no	  commitment	  of	  such	  use	  that	  the	  evidential	  source	  derive	  from	  any	  such	  state	  as	  an	  intuition;	  the	  language	  merely	  serves	  to	  indicate	  a	  weakened	  commitment.	  The	  availability	  of	  the	  hedging	  hypothesis	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  is	  no	  straightforward	  matter	  to	  establish	  evidential	  reliance	  on	  intuitions,	  based	  simply	  on	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  philosophical	  use	  of	  words	  like	  ‘intuitively’.	  Of	  course,	  this	  also	  doesn’t	  show	  that	  intuitions	  aren’t	  used	  as	  important	  evidence	  in	  philosophical	  matters	  all	  the	  time;	  the	  linguistic	  data	  are	  not	  probative.	  Broader	  theoretical	  considerations	  about	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  relevant	  domains	  may	  ultimately	  be	  needed	  to	  settle	  the	  question.6	  We	  turn	  to	  some	  such	  considerations	  now.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Cappelen	  (2012),	  p.	  16	  suggests	  that	  any	  interesting	  version	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  philosophy	  relies	  on	  intuitions	  must	  construe	  this	  as	  a	  respect	  in	  which	  philosophy	  is	  exceptional;	  so	  given	  his	  commitments,	  the	  view	  mentioned	  here	  is	  not	  a	  live	  option.	  However,	  there	  may	  well	  be	  room	  for	  a	  believer	  in	  the	  philosophical	  importance	  of	  intuitions	  to	  identify	  a	  weaker	  respect	  in	  which	  philosophy’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  intuitive	  is	  exceptional—it	  may	  be	  that,	  in	  certain	  core	  philosophical	  cases,	  reliance	  on	  the	  intuitive	  exhausts	  the	  relevant	  evidential	  base,	  while	  in	  other	  fields,	  perceptual	  evidence	  and	  intuitive	  evidence	  together	  comprise	  the	  evidential	  base.	  So	  I	  think	  Cappelen	  is	  a	  bit	  quick	  to	  dismiss	  the	  view	  that	  (some)	  reliance	  on	  intuition	  is	  ubiquitous.	  	  	  5	  For	  example,	  Huemer	  (2001),	  p.	  105.	  6	  Part	  I	  of	  Cappelen	  (2012)	  is	  an	  extended	  argument	  against	  any	  argument	  that	  runs	  from	  philosophical	  language	  to	  the	  reliance	  on	  intuitions;	  I	  agree	  with	  Cappelen	  that	  no	  such	  argument	  will	  be	  convincing.	  However,	  I	  have	  some	  reservations	  about	  the	  way	  that	  he	  has	  set	  up	  the	  dialectic;	  there	  is	  at	  least	  an	  argument	  to	  be	  made	  that,	  given	  its	  orthodoxy,	  the	  view	  that	  philosophy	  does	  proceed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  intuitions	  has	  sufficient	  preliminary	  plausibility	  such	  that	  it	  needn’t	  be	  established	  by	  any	  argument	  from	  the	  way	  philosophers	  talk;	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  hold	  onto	  the	  view	  until	  it	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  false.	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2.	  Intuition	  and	  perceptual	  experience	  Setting	  aside	  arguments	  from	  philosophers’	  linguistic	  use,	  what	  other	  reasons	  might	  there	  be	  to	  suppose	  that	  intuitions	  play	  important	  roles	  in	  philosophy?	  One	  potential	  line	  of	  argument	  begins	  with	  the	  apparent	  difference	  between	  some	  prototypically	  philosophical	  judgments	  and	  more	  straightforwardly	  empirical	  ones.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  what	  happened	  to	  me	  just	  a	  moment	  ago:	  as	  I	  was	  typing,	  I	  had	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  loud	  whooshing	  sound	  outside	  the	  window	  to	  my	  left,	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  nearest	  street;	  this	  experience	  initiated	  a	  causal	  process	  in	  my	  brain,	  which	  ultimately	  led	  me	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  an	  automobile	  recently	  drove	  by.	  How	  does	  this	  process	  compare	  with	  what	  happens	  when	  someone	  achieves	  
philosophical,	  as	  opposed	  to	  perceptual,	  knowledge?	  Suppose	  someone	  starts	  out	  accepting	  the	  view	  that	  pain	  is	  a	  disposition	  to	  a	  certain	  sort	  of	  behavior	  (saying	  ‘ouch’,	  wincing,	  etc.),	  then	  considers	  Hilary	  Putnam’s	  (1963)	  example	  of	  the	  ‘super-­‐super-­‐Spartans’,	  recognizing	  them	  to	  be	  creatures	  who	  have	  phenomenal	  experiences	  just	  like	  our	  pain,	  but	  who	  lack	  any	  such	  dispositions.	  No	  sensory	  experience	  akin	  to	  my	  whooshing	  sensation	  seems	  obviously	  to	  be	  playing	  a	  justificatory	  role	  here.7	  It’s	  all	  very	  well	  to	  say	  that	  it	  needn’t	  be	  an	  intuition	  that’s	  doing	  the	  justifying	  here,	  but,	  unless	  one	  is	  offered	  an	  alternate	  story,	  one	  is	  bound	  to	  remain	  less	  than	  fully	  satisfied.	  Here,	  then,	  in	  rough	  outline,	  is	  a	  possible	  argument	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  intuitions	  in	  standard	  philosophical	  methodology:	  
The	  ‘What	  Else?’	  Argument	  (WEA)	  1. People	  sometimes	  come	  to	  justified	  philosophical	  beliefs	  via	  armchair	  methods.	  2. In	  many	  of	  these	  cases,	  no	  sensory	  experience	  is	  playing	  justificatory	  roles.	  3. All	  justified	  beliefs	  must	  be	  mediated	  by	  something	  like	  sensory	  experience.	  4. Intuitions	  are	  the	  best	  candidates	  for	  such	  experiences	  in	  the	  cases	  in	  question.	  Therefore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  If	  our	  subject	  considers	  Putnam’s	  thought	  experiment	  because	  she’s	  reading	  his	  work,	  or	  being	  introduced	  to	  it	  by	  a	  teacher	  or	  colleague,	  then	  of	  course	  there	  will	  be	  sensory	  experiences	  involved—the	  visual	  impression	  as	  of	  words	  on	  the	  page,	  for	  example.	  But	  these	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  playing	  the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  justificatory	  role	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  Putnam’s	  claims	  about	  this	  case	  are	  correct;	  we	  are	  supposing	  that	  she	  accepts	  the	  argument,	  not	  on	  Putnam’s	  or	  anybody	  else’s	  authority,	  but	  because	  she	  herself	  is	  somehow	  able	  to	  recognize	  that	  it	  is	  correct.	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5. In	  some	  cases,	  people	  come	  to	  justified	  philosophical	  beliefs	  with	  intuitions	  playing	  justificatory	  roles.	  There	  are	  many	  debatable	  points	  in	  the	  WEA.	  Skeptics	  about	  armchair	  philosophy	  (including	  skeptics	  motivated	  by	  experimental	  philosophy,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  below)	  might	  deny	  premise	  (1).	  Quinean	  empiricists,	  who	  think	  that	  it	  is	  ultimately	  our	  sensory	  experience	  that	  justifies	  all	  of	  our	  justified	  beliefs,	  including	  the	  philosophical	  ones	  in	  question,	  will	  deny	  premise	  (2).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  rationalists—I	  am	  one	  of	  them—will	  deny	  premise	  (3),	  offering	  a	  different	  story	  about	  justification	  in	  these	  cases	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  intuition.8	  But	  the	  WEA	  does	  enjoy	  a	  certain	  prima	  facie	  plausibility;	  I	  suspect	  that	  it	  motivates	  at	  least	  some	  philosophers	  towards	  the	  view	  that	  intuitions	  are	  playing	  important	  roles	  in	  armchair	  methods.	  A	  proponent	  of	  the	  WEA	  will	  consider	  intuition	  to	  be	  importantly	  similar	  to	  perceptual	  experience;	  when	  I	  consider	  a	  philosophical	  thought	  experiment,	  I	  undergo	  a	  phenomenal	  experience	  called	  an	  intuition,	  which	  is	  in	  at	  least	  some	  important	  respects	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  experience	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  sensory	  perception.	  At	  least,	  it	  plays	  a	  similar	  justificatory	  role.	  	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  options	  available	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  seriously	  one	  wants	  to	  take	  the	  analogy;	  at	  an	  extreme,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  intuition	  literally	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  sensory	  perception,	  caused	  by	  the	  (presumably	  abstract)	  entities	  that	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  relevant	  judgment;	  perhaps	  it	  is	  by	  causal	  interaction	  with	  the	  Platonic	  form	  of	  the	  Good	  that	  my	  moral	  intuitions	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  moral	  facts.	  This	  somewhat	  incredible	  view	  is	  not	  taken	  very	  seriously	  by	  many,	  although	  it	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  Kurt	  Gödel	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  arithmetic.	  (See	  e.g.	  Parsons	  (1995).)	  More	  moderate	  versions	  of	  the	  WEA-­‐inspired	  analogy	  between	  intuition	  and	  perception	  are	  also	  available.	  For	  example,	  Chudnoff	  (2011)	  suggests	  that	  intuition	  and	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  similar	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  their	  ‘presentational	  phenomenology’,	  telling	  a	  unified	  story	  about	  how	  intuitions	  and	  sensations	  can	  justify	  (while	  avoiding	  the	  commitment	  that	  intuitions	  are	  caused	  by	  their	  contents).	  Call	  a	  philosopher	  who	  holds	  that	  intuitions	  play	  an	  important	  non-­‐empirical	  role	  in	  justifying	  philosophical	  claims	  an	  experientialist	  rationalist—‘rationalist’	  because	  she	  thinks	  there	  are	  non-­‐empirical	  sources	  of	  justification,	  and	  ‘experientialist’	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  approach	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  below;	  Ichikawa	  &	  Jarvis	  (2013)	  develops	  it	  in	  detail.	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because	  she	  thinks	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  having	  an	  intuition	  is	  playing	  an	  important	  justificatory	  role.	  The	  WEA	  may	  be	  thought	  to	  motivate	  experientialist	  rationalism.9	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  unless	  one	  holds	  some	  rather	  extravagant	  metaphysical	  views,	  one	  will	  think	  that	  there	  are	  least	  some	  important	  respects	  in	  which	  any	  role	  played	  by	  intuition	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  philosophical	  beliefs	  is	  disanalogous	  to	  that	  played	  by	  perceptual	  experience	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  perceptual	  beliefs:	  the	  objects	  I	  perceive	  cause	  my	  sensory	  experiences;	  philosophical	  subject	  matters	  don’t	  in	  general	  cause	  my	  intuitions.	  This	  much	  difference	  is	  granted	  by	  most	  parties;	  experientialist	  rationalists,	  however,	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  role	  they	  posit	  for	  intuitions	  in	  philosophical	  knowledge.	  One	  way	  they	  might	  make	  this	  case	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  and	  sensory	  experiences	  indicative	  of	  them	  is	  epistemically	  important	  in	  a	  more	  general	  way	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  causation,	  and	  that	  this	  more	  general	  way	  is	  shared	  with	  the	  case	  of	  intuition.	  One	  version	  of	  this	  view	  would	  embrace	  reliabilism	  about	  evidential	  support.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  reason	  that	  sensory	  experience	  justifies	  perceptual	  belief	  is	  that	  the	  former	  is	  a	  reliable	  indicator	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  latter.	  A	  high	  enough	  proportion	  of	  the	  times	  when	  I	  have	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  sensory	  experiences	  (bright	  light	  sensations,	  a	  feeling	  of	  warmth	  on	  my	  face,	  etc.),	  I	  am	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  sunny	  weather;	  this,	  according	  to	  the	  reliabilist	  in	  question,	  is	  why	  those	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  evidence	  for	  its	  being	  sunny.10	  The	  same	  story	  may	  well	  be	  applied	  to	  at	  least	  many	  cases	  of	  apparent	  ‘intuitive	  justification’.	  When	  one	  considers	  Thompson’s	  thought	  experiment	  about	  the	  violinist,	  one	  undergoes	  a	  certain	  intuitive	  experience;	  one	  feels	  an	  attraction	  to	  judging	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  to	  unplug	  said	  fiddler.	  If,	  a	  high	  enough	  proportion	  of	  the	  time	  when	  such	  intuitions	  occur,	  their	  contents	  are	  true,	  then	  intuitions	  are	  reliable	  indicators	  of	  their	  contents	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  sensory	  experiences	  reliably	  indicate	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  they	  do.	  Although	  the	  latter	  but	  not	  the	  former	  involves	  a	  causal	  connection,	  the	  reliabilist	  is	  not	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  Note,	  however,	  that	  experientialist	  rationalism	  is	  strictly	  stronger	  than	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  WEA;	  one	  may	  embrace	  the	  WEA,	  thereby	  holding	  that	  intuitions	  have	  important	  roles	  to	  play,	  without	  accepting	  rationalism.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  view	  of	  an	  empiricist	  who	  thought	  that	  intuitions	  are	  important,	  but	  only	  because	  they	  themselves	  are	  responsive	  to	  one’s	  empirical	  access	  to	  the	  world.	  (Papineau	  (2009)	  is	  such	  an	  one.)	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  rationalist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  intuitions,	  in	  part	  because	  it	  is	  the	  more	  interesting	  one—there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  intuitions	  do	  not	  play	  an	  ultimately	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  empiricist	  interpretation—and	  in	  part	  because	  I	  think	  there	  are	  good	  general	  objections	  to	  this	  form	  of	  empiricism.	  See	  e.g.	  Bonjour	  (1998)	  ch.	  3,	  Ichikawa	  &	  Jarvis	  (2013)	  ch.	  2.	  (This	  latter	  thought	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  subject	  of	  controversy.)	  10	  For	  reliabilism	  generally,	  including	  distinctions	  between	  ‘process	  reliabilism’	  and	  the	  ‘indicator	  reliabilism’	  here	  discussed,	  see	  Goldman	  (2011).	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interested	  in	  causal	  connections	  per	  se;	  reliability	  is	  paramount,	  and	  that	  feature	  is	  shared	  between	  the	  two	  cases.11	  Prima	  facie,	  it	  is	  reasonably	  plausible	  that	  intuitions	  reliably	  indicate	  their	  contents.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  reasonably	  plausible	  that	  most	  intuitions	  are	  true—at	  least	  if	  we’re	  not	  too	  restrictive	  about	  what	  felt	  attractions	  to	  assent	  count	  as	  intuitions.	  If,	  for	  example,	  the	  feeling	  you	  have	  when	  you	  consider	  whether	  8	  +	  3	  =	  11	  counts	  as	  an	  intuition	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is,	  then	  it,	  then	  this	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  intuition	  whose	  content	  is	  true;	  and	  there	  are	  of	  course	  many	  (many!)	  more	  to	  match	  it.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  intuition	  on	  the	  whole	  is	  very	  reliable,	  and	  therefore	  that	  intuitions	  provide	  evidence	  in	  general?	  Or,	  alternatively,	  should	  we	  think	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  intuitions	  at	  issue	  in	  many	  philosophical	  questions	  as	  comprising	  a	  different	  kind	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  evaluated	  separately	  for	  reliability?	  It	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  for	  reliabilists	  to	  give	  a	  principled	  answer	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  question.12	  	  Another	  problem	  for	  a	  reliabilist	  vindication	  of	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  very	  plausible	  that	  in	  general,	  reliability	  is	  sufficient	  for	  providing	  evidence.	  Suppose	  that	  through	  a	  quirk	  of	  my	  psychology,	  I	  tend	  to	  experience	  the	  intuition	  that	  humans	  are	  intrinsically	  virtuous	  when	  it	  is	  sunny,	  but	  not	  otherwise.	  Suppose	  also	  that	  I	  have	  never	  observed	  this	  correlation	  in	  myself;	  the	  connection	  occurs	  at	  an	  exclusively	  subconscious	  level.	  Since	  the	  intuition	  that	  humans	  are	  intrinsically	  virtuous	  is	  for	  me	  a	  reliable	  indicator	  of	  the	  sun,	  the	  reliabilist	  view	  in	  question	  will	  have	  it	  that	  the	  intuition	  that	  humans	  are	  intrinsically	  virtuous	  is	  evidence	  for	  me	  that	  it	  is	  sunny;	  but	  this	  is	  not	  particularly	  plausible.	  Reflecting	  on	  human	  nature	  and	  noting	  my	  inclinations	  on	  the	  matter	  is	  not,	  under	  the	  circumstances	  described,	  relevant	  to	  determining	  whether	  it	  is	  sunny.	  More	  esoteric	  thought	  experiments	  along	  these	  lines	  have	  been	  widely	  influential	  in	  criticism	  of	  reliabilism,	  e.g.	  Bonjour’s	  (1980)	  case	  of	  Norman	  the	  clairvoyant.	  Let’s	  survey	  one	  more	  attempt	  to	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  that	  intuitions	  may	  be	  importantly	  like	  perceptual	  experience.	  Maybe	  what	  is	  important	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  the	  facts	  perceived	  isn’t	  that	  there	  be	  a	  causal	  link	  or	  a	  mere	  reliable	  correlation,	  but	  that	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reliable	  correlation	  that	  is	  explained	  in	  a	  suitable	  way.	  A	  causal	  connection	  is	  one	  such	  explanation—the	  fact	  that	  red	  objects,	  and	  not	  other	  things,	  tends	  to	  cause	  in	  me	  sensations	  of	  redness	  explains	  why	  in	  general,	  when	  I	  have	  redness	  sensations,	  there	  tend	  to	  be	  red	  things	  around—but	  other	  explanations	  might	  also	  be	  offered.	  One	  prominent	  version	  of	  this	  strategy,	  the	  conceptual	  roles	  strategy,	  ties	  the	  occurrence	  of	  certain	  intuitions	  strongly	  to	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  relevant	  concepts	  (e.g.	  Peacocke	  (1992),	  Boghossian	  (2003)).	  What	  is	  characteristic	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  suggestion	  that	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  entertain	  thoughts	  with	  a	  certain	  concept	  as	  a	  constituent	  is	  to	  be	  inclined	  to	  apply	  it	  in	  certain	  kinds	  of	  cases.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  concept	  TRIANGLE.	  A	  conceptual	  role	  theorist	  might	  suggest	  that	  part	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Bealer	  (1992)	  defends	  intuitions	  as	  evidence	  on	  these	  reliabilist	  grounds.	  12	  This	  is	  the	  ‘generality	  problem’	  for	  reliabilism.	  See	  Conee	  &	  Feldman	  (1998).	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what	  makes	  a	  given	  thought	  a	  thought	  involving	  the	  concept	  TRIANGLE	  is	  that	  the	  thinker	  is	  inclined	  to	  apply	  the	  concept	  to	  all	  and	  only	  three-­‐sided	  polygons;	  somebody	  who	  felt	  no	  intuitive	  repulsion	  from	  applying	  a	  given	  concept	  to	  objects	  with	  four	  sides,	  according	  to	  the	  conceptual	  role	  theorist,	  just	  wouldn’t	  count	  as	  possessing	  the	  concept	  TRIANGLE.	  If	  this	  theory	  about	  the	  possession	  of	  concepts	  is	  correct,	  then	  the	  conceptual	  role	  semanticist	  can	  offer	  a	  non-­‐causal	  explanation	  for	  the	  reliability	  of	  intuitions	  such	  as	  these:	  possession	  of	  these	  intuitions	  is	  what	  settles	  the	  content	  as	  what	  it	  is,	  which	  it	  turn	  guarantees	  that	  the	  intuitions	  will	  be	  true.	  So	  there	  is	  a	  philosophical	  explanation	  for	  reliability—one	  which	  runs	  through	  the	  theory	  of	  mental	  content.	  The	  conceptual	  role	  strategy	  is	  controversial;	  closer	  examination	  would	  take	  us	  too	  far	  afield	  in	  this	  survey,	  but	  here	  in	  brief	  are	  two	  characteristic	  challenges.	  First,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  strategy	  might	  over-­‐generate	  justified	  reliance	  on	  intuition;	  it	  appears	  as	  though	  there	  could	  be	  cases	  of	  concepts	  that	  are	  tied	  to	  reliable	  conceptual	  roles	  that	  do	  not	  accompany	  justified	  beliefs.13	  Second,	  one	  might	  worry	  about	  the	  underlying	  theory	  of	  content;	  for	  any	  given	  intuition	  that	  one	  might	  think	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  given	  concept,	  there	  might	  be	  possible	  cases	  where	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  content	  is	  present,	  but	  the	  intuition	  is	  absent.14	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  even	  if	  these	  challenges	  can	  be	  met,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  conceptual	  role	  strategy	  is	  probably	  somewhat	  limited;	  even	  if	  some	  intuitions	  are	  essential	  for	  the	  possession	  of	  given	  contents,	  not	  all	  invocations	  of	  intuition	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy	  are	  plausibly	  such	  compulsory	  ones.	  Perhaps	  Gettier’s	  intuition	  about	  his	  famous	  cases	  is	  a	  candidate	  for	  an	  intuition	  that	  is	  partly	  constitutive	  of	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  concept	  KNOWS,	  but	  it	  is	  more	  doubtful	  that	  Thompson’s	  intuition	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  unplug	  a	  violinist	  in	  a	  given	  situation	  could	  be	  constitutive	  of	  the	  possession	  of	  any	  of	  the	  relevant	  concepts.	  (Which	  concept	  is	  even	  a	  candidate	  for	  requiring	  such	  an	  intuition?	  PERMISSIBLE?	  UNPLUG?	  VIOLINIST?)	  Having	  surveyed	  a	  few	  attempts	  to	  explain	  how	  experientialist	  rationalism	  might	  be	  explained,	  let	  us	  turn	  briefly	  to	  an	  argument	  against	  experientialist	  rationalism.	  According	  to	  the	  argument	  from	  blind	  irrationality,	  intuitions	  cannot	  play	  a	  role	  closely	  analogous	  to	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience;	  their	  doing	  so	  would	  fail	  to	  respect	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  norms	  of	  rationality	  are	  objective.	  This	  argument	  plays	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  Part	  III	  of	  Ichikawa	  &	  Jarvis	  (2013).	  To	  introduce	  it,	  we	  first	  back	  up	  and	  consider	  different	  kinds	  of	  epistemic	  roles	  that	  experiences	  might	  play.	  Set	  aside	  intuitions	  for	  a	  moment	  and	  consider	  Boris	  and	  Natasha,	  who	  are	  playing	  chess.	  Natasha	  is	  playing	  white;	  it	  is	  her	  move.	  The	  position	  of	  the	  pieces	  is	  as	  given	  in	  figure	  1:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Boghossian	  (2003)	  considers	  and	  essays	  a	  response	  to	  this	  worry.	  14	  For	  this	  worry	  see	  Williamson	  (2007),	  pp.	  86-­‐91.	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Figure	  1	  Natasha	  has	  available	  a	  move	  to	  win	  the	  game;	  Rh3#	  (moving	  her	  rook	  to	  the	  far	  right	  of	  the	  board)	  places	  the	  black	  king	  in	  checkmate.	  Bullwinkle	  knows	  the	  rules	  of	  chess,	  but	  he	  is	  nevertheless	  unaware	  that	  Natasha	  has	  available	  a	  move	  to	  win	  the	  game.	  His	  ignorance	  shouldn’t	  be	  too	  surprising,	  because,	  it	  turns	  out,	  he	  is	  blindfolded,	  and	  can’t	  see	  the	  board.	  He	  has	  no	  idea	  where	  the	  pieces	  are,	  so	  of	  course	  he	  doesn’t	  know	  that	  Natasha	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  win.	  But	  what	  happens	  next	  is	  slightly	  more	  interesting.	  Bullwinkle’s	  blindfold	  slips	  off,	  and	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  he	  sees	  the	  board	  and	  the	  position	  of	  each	  piece.	  Now	  he	  knows	  a	  lot	  more	  about	  the	  game.	  But,	  let’s	  suppose,	  he	  still	  doesn’t	  know	  that	  Natasha	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  win.	  You	  see,	  Bullwinkle	  isn’t	  a	  very	  experienced	  chess	  player,	  and	  although	  he	  knows	  where	  each	  piece	  is,	  and	  knows	  all	  the	  rules	  of	  chess,	  he	  hasn’t	  noticed	  that	  Rh3	  would	  put	  Boris	  in	  checkmate.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  important	  steps	  to	  knowledge	  in	  cases	  like	  this	  one.	  First,	  there	  is	  an	  input	  step:	  one	  needs	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  information	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  knowledge.	  Bullwinkle	  achieved	  this	  step	  when	  his	  blindfold	  slipped.	  But	  second,	  there	  is	  a	  processing	  step:	  one	  needs	  to	  manipulate	  and	  process	  the	  information	  one	  has	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  out	  the	  relevant	  conclusions.	  The	  processing	  step	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  having	  enough	  sensory	  experience—Bullwinkle	  has	  that,	  once	  he	  can	  see—it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  rational	  ability.	  Once	  his	  eyes	  are	  open,	  Bullwinkle’s	  ignorance	  is	  attributable	  not	  to	  the	  facts’	  being	  hidden	  to	  him;	  the	  problem	  now	  is	  that	  he	  hasn’t	  succeeded	  in	  thinking	  through	  the	  situation	  clearly	  enough.	  Let’s	  say	  that	  when	  a	  subject’s	  information	  provides	  conclusive	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  the	  subject	  has	  propositional	  justification	  for	  p.	  As	  we	  have	  just	  seen,	  propositional	  justification	  does	  not	  imply	  knowledge;	  it	  requires	  rational	  skill	  to	  react	  properly	  to	  propositional	  justification.	  In	  cases	  like	  the	  chess	  case	  above,	  sensory	  experience	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  establishing	  propositional	  justification,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  ensure	  that	  Bullwinkle’s	  rational	  capacities	  will	  pick	  up	  the	  slack.	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It	  is	  characteristic	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  in	  general	  that	  sensory	  experience	  provide	  propositional	  justification.	  Because	  one	  has	  had	  the	  necessary	  sensory	  experience,	  any	  continued	  ignorance	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  rational	  failure.	  A	  rationally	  perfect	  agent	  who	  has	  enough	  experience	  will	  always	  form	  the	  justified	  beliefs.	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  blind	  irrationality	  is	  that	  intuitions	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  this	  normative	  role	  in	  the	  propositional	  justification	  of	  philosophical	  beliefs.	  Consider	  this	  case	  from	  Ichikawa	  &	  Jarvis	  (2013):	  Jack	  is	  trying	  to	  build	  a	  time	  machine;	  indeed,	  he	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  nearly	  completed.	  Jack	  believes	  that,	  once	  he	  builds	  his	  time	  machine,	  he	  will	  go	  back	  in	  time.	  Jack’s	  one	  major	  regret	  in	  life	  is	  having	  done	  so	  poorly	  on	  the	  final	  exam	  for	  his	  class	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  time.	  He	  intends	  and	  believes,	  therefore,	  that	  when	  he	  goes	  back	  in	  time,	  he	  will	  tell	  his	  past	  self	  the	  right	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  on	  the	  exam	  so	  that	  it	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  case	  that	  he	  did	  so	  poorly.	  Jack	  is	  confused;	  he	  is	  exhibiting	  rational	  failures.	  How	  do	  we	  know	  this?	  Because	  he	  thinks	  that	  he’s	  going	  to	  go	  back	  in	  time	  and	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  he	  did	  better	  than	  he	  actually	  did	  on	  his	  exam—an	  intrinsically	  confused	  thing	  to	  think.	  (Suppose	  he	  succeeded;	  then	  he	  won’t	  have	  had	  his	  regret	  about	  his	  past	  performance,	  so	  he	  won’t	  have	  bothered	  to	  build	  a	  time	  machine,	  so	  he	  won’t	  have	  gone	  back	  in	  time,	  so	  he	  will	  after	  all	  fail	  his	  exam	  as	  ‘before’…)	  Importantly,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  Jack’s	  situation	  constitutes	  one	  involving	  rational	  shortcomings	  regardless	  of	  what	  intuitions	  he	  has.	  Suppose	  that	  Jack	  has	  no	  intuition	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  he	  cannot	  go	  back	  and	  change	  the	  way	  things	  went	  in	  the	  past;	  this	  doesn’t	  render	  his	  position	  any	  less	  confused.	  (Indeed,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  he’s	  more	  confused	  in	  this	  case;	  his	  confusion	  is	  not	  even	  mitigated	  by	  the	  nagging	  intuition	  of	  sensibility.)	  But	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  we	  should	  expect,	  if	  intuitions	  play	  the	  role	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  play	  here.	  Someone	  who	  doesn’t	  think	  that	  Natasha	  can	  put	  Boris	  in	  checkmate	  demonstrates	  no	  rational	  shortcoming	  whatsoever	  if	  he	  can’t	  see	  the	  position	  of	  the	  pieces	  on	  the	  board;	  but	  Jack’s	  belief	  constitutes	  confusion	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  has	  the	  relevant	  intuitions.	  Jack’s	  ignorance	  is	  blind;	  he	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  recognize	  that	  he	  is	  going	  wrong,	  rationally	  speaking.	  But	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  he	  isn’t	  so	  going	  wrong.	  This	  is	  a	  respect	  in	  which	  the	  constraints	  of	  rationality	  are	  objective;	  they	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  possession	  of	  states	  like	  intuitions.	  In	  this	  respect,	  intuitions	  cannot	  play	  a	  role	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  similar	  to	  the	  role	  that	  sensory	  experience	  plays	  in	  justifying	  perceptual	  belief.	  So	  goes	  the	  blind	  irrationality	  argument.	  This	  argument	  is	  controversial;	  some	  philosophers	  will	  respond	  that	  if	  Jack	  really	  does	  have	  no	  intuition	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  change	  the	  past,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  respect	  in	  which	  he	  need	  be	  falling	  short	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  rationality.	  I	  have	  never	  found	  this	  response	  very	  plausible;	  Benjamin	  Jarvis	  and	  I	  articulate	  some	  reasons	  why	  in	  our	  (2013,	  §12.5).	  But	  in	  this	  survey	  article,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  move	  on	  to	  other	  things.	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Before	  considering	  the	  bearing	  of	  experimental	  philosophy	  on	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy,	  let	  us	  return	  briefly	  to	  the	  WEA.	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  intuitions	  do	  not	  play	  a	  role	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  similar	  to	  the	  role	  that	  sensory	  experience	  plays,	  then	  how	  could	  it	  be	  that	  philosophical	  (and	  other	  a	  priori)	  claims	  can	  be	  justified?	  My	  preferred	  answer,	  developed	  again	  in	  Ichikawa	  &	  Jarvis	  (2013),	  is	  that	  the	  a	  priori	  contents	  are	  by	  their	  nature	  such	  that	  there	  is	  conclusive	  reason	  to	  accept	  them,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  absence	  of	  intuitions.	  Everyone	  must	  think	  this	  about	  at	  least	  some	  contents	  or	  transitions	  in	  thought,	  on	  pain	  of	  infinite	  regress;15	  once	  this	  observation	  is	  made,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  intuitions	  need	  play	  no	  particularly	  direct	  role	  in	  establishing	  propositional	  justification	  at	  all.	  This	  is	  in	  effect	  to	  deny	  premise	  (3)	  of	  the	  WEA	  as	  outlined	  above:	  not	  all	  justified	  beliefs	  need	  follow	  the	  model	  of	  perception.	  Let	  us	  continue	  the	  survey	  now,	  and	  consider	  the	  recent	  movement	  of	  experimental	  philosophy.	  
3.	  Experimental	  philosophy	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  orthodoxy	  has	  it	  that	  contemporary	  philosophy	  relies	  on	  intuitions	  in	  an	  evidential	  capacity,	  but	  it	  is	  debatable	  whether	  orthodoxy	  is	  correct	  in	  this	  matter.	  What	  does	  any	  of	  this	  mean	  for	  the	  ‘experimental	  philosophy’	  movement	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy?	  As	  a	  historical	  fact,	  it	  is	  reasonably	  clear	  that	  experimental	  philosophy	  developed	  in	  part	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  intuitions	  were	  playing	  important	  evidential	  roles.16	  According	  to	  a	  simple	  version	  of	  this	  outlook,	  armchair	  philosophers	  have	  been	  relying	  on	  claims	  about	  which	  intuitions	  are	  widespread,	  assuming	  their	  own	  intuitions	  to	  be	  a	  representative	  sample.	  But	  it	  is	  of	  course	  an	  empirical	  question	  whether	  one’s	  intuitions	  are	  idiosyncratic,	  and	  some	  experimental	  philosophers	  have	  uncovered	  evidence	  that	  many	  of	  the	  influential	  intuitions	  are.	  Surveys	  of	  laypeople’s	  intuitions	  have,	  according	  to	  the	  experimentalists	  in	  question,	  yielded	  surprising	  diversity	  of	  intuition.	  Not	  everyone,	  it	  turns	  out,	  shares	  the	  Gettier	  intuition,	  so	  the	  many	  arguments	  that	  relied	  on	  the	  universality	  of	  the	  Gettier	  intuition	  are	  unsound.	  Relatedly,	  some	  intuitions	  seem	  to	  be	  susceptible	  to	  biases	  and	  order	  effects;	  this	  is	  thought	  to	  undermine	  an	  evidential	  use	  for	  such	  intuitions.	  It	  is	  controversial	  whether	  the	  kinds	  of	  survey	  data	  experimentalists	  have	  uncovered	  demonstrate	  that	  philosophical	  intuitions	  vary	  in	  surprising	  ways.	  Some	  defenders	  of	  armchair	  methods	  have	  argued	  that,	  rather	  than	  uncovering	  genuinely	  divergent	  intuitions,	  the	  survey	  studies	  are	  best	  interpreted	  as	  suggesting	  that	  different	  groups	  of	  people	  tend	  to	  use	  slightly	  different	  concepts	  (Sosa	  (2007)).	  Others	  admit	  that	  the	  surveys	  may	  uncover	  disagreement,	  but	  argue	  that	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  many	  morals	  of	  Carroll	  (1895).	  16	  Weinberg	  et.	  al.	  (2001)	  is	  a	  highly	  influential	  work	  that	  is	  explicit	  in	  this	  commitment.	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disagreement	  doesn’t	  undermine	  the	  evidential	  use	  to	  which	  professional	  philosophers	  put	  their	  own	  intuitions,	  as	  the	  latter	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  special	  expertise	  that	  the	  laypeople	  surveyed	  shouldn’t	  be	  expected	  to	  share	  (Kauppinen	  (2007),	  Williamson	  (2011)).	  Space	  precludes	  going	  into	  these	  questions	  in	  depth	  here;	  instead,	  let’s	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  experimentalist	  critique	  depends	  on	  particular	  assumptions	  about	  the	  evidential	  role	  for	  intuitions	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy.	  In	  particular,	  what	  would	  follow	  if,	  along	  the	  lines	  suggested	  above,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  armchair	  philosophers	  rarely	  or	  never	  rely	  on	  intuitions	  in	  an	  evidential	  capacity?	  Joshua	  Alexander	  and	  Jonathan	  Weinberg	  (2007)	  suggest	  that	  not	  much	  really	  hangs	  on	  whether	  intuitions	  are	  used	  as	  evidence,	  as	  data	  uncovered	  by	  the	  the	  surveys	  in	  question	  transcend	  any	  particular	  questions	  about	  what	  roles	  intuitions	  do	  or	  do	  not	  play.	  In	  response	  to	  Timothy	  Williamson’s	  (2007)	  argument	  that	  philosophical	  arguments	  typically	  proceed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  known	  facts	  about	  cases,	  rather	  than	  psychological	  intuitions	  about	  them,	  they	  write:	  
Timothy Williamson has also developed a more radical response to the 
restrictionist threat: rejecting the picture of philosophical practice as 
depending on intuitions at all! … He compares philosophical practice to 
scientific practice, where we do not take the perceptual seemings of the 
scientists as our evidence, but the facts about what they observed. 
Similarly, then, we should construe Getter’s evidence to be not his 
intellectual seeming that his case is not an instance of knowledge, but 
rather the modal fact itself that such a case is not an instance of knowledge 
… But we do not think that Williamson’s arguments can provide much 
solace for traditional analytic philosophers. For the results of experimental 
philosophers are not themselves framed in terms of intuitions, but in terms 
of the counterfactual judgments of various subjects under various 
circumstances. Although the results are often glossed in terms of intuitions 
to follow standard philosophical usage, inspection of the experimental 
materials reveals little talk of intuitions and mostly the direct evaluation of 
claims. (72) Alexander	  and	  Weinberg	  are	  correct	  that	  the	  methods	  of	  experimental	  philosophy	  do	  not	  rely	  in	  particular	  on	  claims	  about	  intuitions,	  rather	  than	  other	  kinds	  of	  psychological	  states—one	  can	  run	  the	  experimentalist	  critique	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘considered	  judgments’	  just	  as	  well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘intuitions’—but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  far	  this	  observation	  can	  take	  us.	  For	  the	  experimental	  methods	  in	  question—typically	  surveys—can	  always	  reveal	  at	  best	  psychological	  claims,	  whether	  intuitions,	  beliefs,	  considered	  judgments,	  or	  whatever.	  And	  the	  arguments	  against	  the	  evidential	  significance	  of	  intuitions	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  look	  to	  be	  rather	  general	  arguments	  against	  the	  reliance	  on	  psychological	  evidence	  in	  philosophical	  matters.	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In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  Alexander	  and	  Weinberg,	  Herman	  Cappelen	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  once	  we	  let	  go	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  intuitions	  are	  playing	  important	  evidential	  roles,	  any	  interest	  experimental	  philosophy	  might	  have	  held	  will	  look	  misplaced:	  
The Big Objection to experimental philosophy is easy to state and should 
be obvious: philosophers don’t rely on intuitions about thought 
experiments, so studies of intuitions people have about thought 
experiments have no direct relevance for philosophical arguments or 
theorizing. … In short: If philosophers don’t rely on intuitions, then the 
project of checking people’s intuitions is philosophically pointless. (221-
22) There	  is	  room,	  however,	  for	  a	  denier	  of	  the	  evidential	  importance	  of	  intuitions	  to	  be	  more	  sympathetic	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  project	  of	  experimental	  philosophy.	  For	  there	  are	  more	  significant	  roles	  for	  intuitions	  (or	  other	  psychological	  states)	  to	  play	  than	  evidential	  ones.	  If	  intuitions	  are	  not	  evidence,	  or	  even	  a	  source	  of	  evidence,	  they	  might	  still	  be	  a	  source	  of	  defeat.	  Evidence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  X	  may	  well	  be	  relevant	  to	  one’s	  justification	  for	  believing	  Y,	  even	  when	  X	  wasn’t	  being	  used	  as	  evidence	  for	  Y.	  For	  example,	  I	  saw	  for	  myself	  that	  my	  colleague	  across	  the	  hall	  has	  a	  bamboo	  plant	  on	  her	  desk.	  My	  evidence	  concerning	  her	  bamboo	  is	  not	  testimonial;	  it	  is	  perceptual.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  possible	  courses	  of	  testimony	  that	  might	  defeat	  my	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  she	  has	  bamboo	  on	  her	  desk.	  For	  example,	  I	  might	  receive	  testimony	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  she	  often	  adorns	  her	  office	  with	  fake	  bamboo;	  this	  testimony	  would	  undermine	  my	  perceptual	  justification,	  even	  though	  testimony	  was	  no	  part	  of	  my	  original	  evidence.	  It	  is	  not	  too	  far-­‐fetched	  to	  imagine	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  experimental	  philosophy’s	  discoveries	  about	  intuitions	  might	  serve	  to	  undermine	  some	  of	  our	  philosophical	  beliefs,	  even	  if	  intuitions	  weren’t	  any	  part	  of	  our	  evidence	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Evidence	  to	  the	  effect	  that,	  in	  certain	  kinds	  of	  cases,	  certain	  philosophical	  intuitions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  pretty	  unreliable	  would	  give	  us	  rational	  reason	  to	  second-­‐guess	  whether	  we	  may	  have	  judged	  correctly	  about	  these	  cases.	  Suppose	  I	  consider	  a	  thought	  experiment,	  and	  am	  persuaded	  by	  a	  philosophical	  argument	  that	  it	  exemplifies	  an	  instance	  of	  causation.	  The	  discovery	  that	  people	  like	  me	  tend	  to	  be	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  certain	  factors	  that	  are	  clearly	  not	  relevant	  to	  causation	  would	  give	  me	  good	  reason	  to	  reconsider	  my	  reasoning,	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  I	  haven’t	  been	  making	  this	  common	  mistake.	  It	  is	  along	  this	  model,	  I	  think,	  that	  many	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  instances	  of	  skeptical	  worries	  deriving	  from	  experimental	  philosophy	  are	  best	  construed.17	  Notably,	  this	  is	  a	  form	  of	  skeptical	  pressure	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  questionable	  assumption	  that	  intuitions	  are	  widely	  treated	  as	  important	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  philosophical	  claims.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ichikawa	  (manuscript)	  distinguishes	  another	  strand	  of	  skeptical	  experimental	  philosophy	  that	  does	  look	  to	  be	  more	  intimately	  committed	  to	  a	  central	  role	  for	  intuitions	  in	  traditional	  methods.	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How	  worried	  should	  practitioners	  of	  traditional	  armchair	  philosophy	  be	  by	  the	  kinds	  of	  skeptical	  arguments	  pressed	  by	  experimental	  philosophers?	  Some	  of	  the	  latter	  suggest	  that	  the	  former	  should	  be	  very	  worried	  indeed;	  Weinberg	  et.	  al	  (2001,	  p.	  429)	  write	  that	  “a	  sizeable	  group	  of	  epistemological	  projects—a	  group	  which	  includes	  much	  of	  what	  has	  been	  done	  in	  epistemology	  in	  the	  analytic	  tradition”	  is	  “seriously	  undermined”	  by	  survey	  data	  they	  have	  found;	  similarly,	  Machery	  et.	  al.	  (2004,	  pp.	  B8	  and	  B9)	  tell	  us	  that	  they	  have	  uncovered	  evidence	  that	  shows	  traditional	  philosophical	  assumptions	  to	  be	  “spectacularly	  misguided,”	  and	  that	  as	  a	  consequence,	  “philosophers	  must	  radically	  revise	  their	  methodology.”	  But,	  as	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  pointed	  out,	  there	  is	  sensitive	  philosophical	  work	  to	  be	  done	  in	  articulating	  what	  scope	  the	  skeptical	  worries	  will	  take;	  the	  form	  of	  undermining	  worry	  suggested	  above	  is	  a	  wholly	  general	  one:	  any	  judgment	  about	  anything	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  undermined	  by	  psychological	  evidence	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  one	  might	  be	  forming	  beliefs	  in	  an	  unreliable	  way	  (Sosa	  2007;	  Williamson	  2007;	  Cappelen	  2012).	  Unless	  one	  wants	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  surveys	  experimental	  philosophers	  use	  show	  that	  we’re	  proceeding	  badly	  in	  all	  domains	  (something	  no	  serious	  experimental	  philosopher	  has	  to	  my	  knowledge	  defended),	  there	  is	  a	  substantive	  challenge	  of	  articulating	  which	  of	  our	  philosophical	  projects	  are	  undermined,	  and	  why	  the	  worry	  doesn’t	  apply	  more	  broadly.	  To	  broach	  controversial	  matters	  again:	  it	  is	  my	  view	  this	  challenge	  has	  never	  been	  adequately	  met;	  experimental	  philosophy	  has	  not	  established	  a	  respect	  in	  which	  armchair	  philosophical	  methods	  in	  particular	  are	  problematic.18	  
Conclusion	  In	  summary:	  It	  is	  widely,	  but	  not	  universally,	  supposed	  that	  contemporary	  philosophy	  relies	  in	  a	  distinctive	  way	  on	  intuitions	  in	  an	  evidential	  capacity;	  evaluating	  whether	  this	  is	  so	  via	  linguistic	  data	  is	  far	  from	  trivial.	  Epistemic	  models	  of	  the	  respect	  in	  which	  intuitions	  might	  play	  a	  perception-­‐like	  role	  have	  been	  surveyed;	  my	  view	  is	  that	  the	  blind	  irrationality	  argument	  undermines	  any	  such	  view.	  Nothing	  follows	  very	  straightforwardly	  from	  any	  of	  this	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  experimental	  philosophy,	  but	  the	  skeptical	  pressure	  it	  presses	  must	  be	  pressed	  very	  subtly,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  to	  issue	  into	  skepticism	  in	  general.	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